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In Defense of Newtonian Induction: Hume’s Problem of Induction




This paper aims to advance two claims. First, it aims to show that Hume’s argument against the
rationality of induction is sound. However, I claim that the conclusion does not follow merely from the
self-defeating attempts to justify the rule of induction, unlike traditional readings of the argument.
Rather, the skeptical conclusion must also take into account Hume’s argument that the secret powers
that are present in bodies and give rise to sensible qualities are unknowable. The paper’s second aim
is to show that Newtonian induction escapes Hume’s secret powers argument, given that it includes
a transductive inference, from observable phenomena to the powers present in the ultimate parts of
matter. Consequently Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction does not demonstrate
the non-rational nature of Newtonian induction.
1 Introduction
This paper articulates a certain reading of Hume’s argument against the rationality of induction.
Unlike traditional interpretations of Hume’s argument, mine takes his argument to involve two distinct
sub-arguments; the first is that inductive inferences lack rational support. I term this sub-argument
the No Rational Support Argument (NRSA) (Section 2). I also argue that Hume uses a second sub-
argument, one I term the Secret Powers Argument, or SPA, to undermine our belief in the rationality
of induction. According to the SPA (examined in Section 3), we do not have access to the secret
powers of bodies. The implication is that we have no method for securing our belief that the same
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sensible qualities are accompanied by the same secret powers. Commentators normally focus on the
NRSA without paying enough attention to the SPA. The consequence of this neglect is that most
commentators assume that Hume’s skepticism ought to follow from the NRSA alone, or, in other
words, that the mere lack of rational justification for induction implies that induction is unjustified. I
claim, however, that the NRSA is insufficient for deriving Hume’s skeptical conclusion and that only
by considering the SPA does the skeptical conclusion follow.
The further aim of my paper is to demonstrate that a Newtonian form of induction presupposes a
transductive argument, according to which qualities of composite entities are shown to be reducible
to qualities of their ultimate parts (Section 4). My claim is that Newton’s transductive argument
undermines Hume’s SPA. This implies that Hume’s skeptical conclusion lacks the bite required to
directly undermine Newtonian induction (Section 5).
2 The No Rational Support Argument
There is no overall agreement among interpreters regarding the purpose of Hume’s argument and the
nature of his achievement. The widespread view among philosophers is that Hume has successfully
articulated a powerful argument against the rationality of inductive inferences. Popper (2003, 6) is a
prominent example of someone who thinks that Hume’s argument is insurmountable; Popper concludes
that one should adopt a hypothetico-deductive method of scientific inquiry. Some commentators
claim that Hume’s aim was not to articulate a skeptical conclusion regarding induction but merely to
point out that induction does not fall under the cannon of “demonstrative” or deductive reasoning
(Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981; Broughton, 1983; Arnold, 1983).
In contrast, other commentators (e.g., Garrett (1997, 87-91), Millican (1998, 2012)) have argued that
the non-skeptical reading seems incongruent with Hume’s attempt to undermine the arguments that
could potentially be given in support of inductive conclusions. I agree with the skeptical reading of
Hume’s argument, and my aim in this paper is to show that one ought to draw a skeptical conclusion
regarding probable reasoning, as long as such probable reasoning can be modeled in the way Hume
models it.
According to the standard reading, Hume aims to undermine the epistemic warrant that is provided
by the inductive inference. But some commentators (Garrett, 1997) take Hume’s argument to be
directed at showing that no cognitive faculty of the human mind is capable of forcing the inductive
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conclusion. The latter descriptivist interpretation of Hume’s argument finds Hume to be primarily
concerned with developing a psychological theory of mind. It sees the skeptical argument as directed
against the idea that such a theory can include some cognitive faculty other than the imagination that
is able to force the inductive conclusion. My reading goes beyond the descriptivist account because I
hold that the the lack of epistemic warrant follows only if one considers the SPA. But the SPA is not
about the cognitive faculties of the knower; rather, it explores a metaphysical possibility that shows
the potential unreliability of inductive procedures.
Hume begins his discussion with a distinction between Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact (E
4.1, SBN 25).1 There are two criteria for differentiating between relations of ideas and matters of
fact. The first criterion concerns the relation between the truth of the proposition and existent things.
If the truth of the proposition is determined by the mere operation of the mind and is independent
of what is anywhere existent in the universe, it is a relation of ideas. If its truth is dependent on
existent things, it is a matter of fact. The second criterion Hume articulates for distinguishing between
relations of ideas and matters of fact is concerned with the modality of the truth of the proposition.
The contrary of a relation of ideas leads to a contradiction, while the contrary of a matter of fact does
not; that is, one is able to conceive of the contrary and imagine its possibility.
Hume argues that all matters of fact that concern external objects that are not immediately present
to our senses must rely on relations of cause and effect (E 4.4, SBN 26-7). This implies for Hume that
any matter of fact that pertains to objects that are not immediately present to the senses presupposes
knowledge of causal relations.
Hume introduces skeptical doubts about propositions expressing matters of fact, by introducing
doubts into causal relations. The argument is bifurcated in that the proposition expressing a causal
relation may be either a relation of ideas or a matter of fact. For each type of proposition, one
would expect different types of reasoning given in support of it. A relation of ideas is given a priori
justification, while a matter of fact is provided justification based on experience. Hume claims that
neither type of justification is suitable to ground a causal claim.
2.1 Why a priori reasoning cannot justify causal claims
Hume asserts that a causal claim is not a relation of ideas (E 4.6, SBN 27). There are various ways in
which Hume attempts to demonstrate this claim, but they all boil down to the notion that the cause
1E refers to Hume (1975) and SBN refers to Hume (1978). Quotes from taken from https://davidhume.org/.
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is separable from the effect. If it is conceivable in the imagination that the cause exists without the
effect that follows, the relation between cause and effect cannot be a relation of ideas.
It is important for Hume to stress that even laws of nature–for example, the conservation of
quantity of motion–cannot be treated as relations of ideas:
But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without
exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice.
. . . The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most ac-
curate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and
consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is a quite
distinct event from motion in the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and
left without any support, immediately falls; but to consider the matter a priori, is there
anything we discover in this situation which can beg the idea of a downward, rather than
an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal? (E 4.9, SBN 29)
We see that, while the initial target of Hume’s remarks were causal relations, the discussion quickly
turns to fundamental laws of nature and to Newtonian science. Hume argues that both the mechanical
laws stemming from the conservation of quantity of motion (momentum) and the law of gravitation,
cannot be justified using a priori reasoning; they are not dependent on the mere operation of thought,
but must rely on experience.
Another way in which Hume shows that causal relations are not relations of ideas is by arguing
that the effect cannot be derived from the cause using any a priori reasoning.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the
knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasoning a´ priori; but arises
entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined
with each other. (E 4.6, SBN 27)
This suggests that the initial failure is in being able to demonstrate that a causal relation is a relation
of ideas. If such a demonstration were possible, one would be able to derive the effect from the cause
using some carefully constructed demonstration that is grounded in the ideas themselves. Perhaps this
could be done by observing the cause and then, via some abstract inference, deducing the presence of
the effect.
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Hume argues that it is not possible to find an a priori reasoning for a causal relation. According to
Hume’s account of rational demonstration, one is either directly aware of two ideas being inseparable in
some way, or it is possible to construct a chain of reasoning, using distinct steps involving inseparable
ideas, leading from one idea to another.2 In the Treatise, Hume argues that certainty in demonstration
arises from particular relations that make the ideas inseparable:
All certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations
as are unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same. These relations are resemblance,
proportions in quantity and number, degrees of any quality, and contrariety. (T 1.3.3.2,
SBN 79)3
These philosophical relations provide the underpinning of rational demonstrations. They must be
present whenever a claim is shown to be “intuitively or demonstratively certain.”
But the relation between cause and effect cannot be demonstrated in such a way. The ultimate
proof that such a demonstration is not possible is that the idea of the cause is distinct and separable
from the idea of the effect. Given that the two ideas in a causal relation are taken to be contiguous,
they are present at distinct moments in time. And so, by definition, one can conceive of the cause
without the effect materializing, and the two ideas are separable. Thus, it would not be possible to
find any demonstration leading from the cause to the effect because that such a demonstration is
based on linking pairs of inseparable ideas.
Section 4 will consider Newton’s argument in support of laws of nature. At this point I would
merely point out that Newton agrees that laws of nature are not discovered using intuitive or demon-
strative reasoning, but instead ought to be derived from the phenomena with the help of some inductive
procedure.
Hume claims that however successful a science might be in simplifying phenomena and reducing
them to fundamental laws, knowledge of the ultimate grounds for these laws remains hidden from our
understanding:
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive
of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into
2For Hume the inseparability of ideas is the foundation for demonstrative reasoning: “In order therefore to know, whether
abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which
we abstract from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and different from those, which we retain as essential
parts of them” (T 1.1.7.3, SBN 18-9). See also De Pierris (2015, Section 2.2).
3T refers to the original edition of the Treatise.
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a few general causes, by means of reasoning from analogy, experience, and observation. But
as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall
we ever be able to satisfy outselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate
causes and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion
of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and
principles we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy,
if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or
near to, these general principles. (E 4.12, SBN 30-1)
Thus Hume allows that science has a role in articulating general principles, such as the laws of
motion and the law of gravity, to explain various phenomena. But he takes the “causes of the general
causes”–that is, the causes that bring about these principles– as inaccessible to the human mind. The
implication is that reason, by itself, is not able to discover the causes that ground laws of nature.4
2.2 Why experience cannot ground causal claims
Given that the causal claim is not a relation of ideas, it must ultimately be derived from experience.
But how would this derivation work? Hume describes the inference as follows:
. . . there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to
be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such
an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects,
which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. (E 4.16, SBN 32)
So Hume is concerned with the inference one draws from “All observed As are Bs” to “All As are
Bs”. We shall refer to this inference as the Rule of Induction (RI). The problem is that the reasoning
seems to lack justification. This type of inference cannot be reduced to intuitive or demonstrative
reasoning because of the initial part of the argument, according to which a causal relation is not a
relation of ideas.
If one one seeks to justify inductive inferences using probable reasoning, one runs into circular
justification: “To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or
arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which
is the very point in question” (E 4.19, SBN 35-6). How exactly is the circularity in justification created?
4See Schliesser (2008, 2009) for an evaluation of Hume’s philosophy vis-a-vis Newton’s work.
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Hume argues that in any inductive generalization, the implicit assumption is that the unexamined
cases will be like examined cases, or that the future will resemble the past (E 4.19, SBN 35-6). We
call this assumption the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature (PUN).
To describe the argument somewhat formally, the circularity of the argument seems to be concerned
with the inductive inference, and the presuppositions that one might provide to justify the inference.
The claim is that if we are to try to show why the RI is reliable it compels us to think of the PUN
as the principle that might justify the reliability of RI. However, the PUN cannot be shown to be
true using demonstrative reasoning. It is conceivable that unexamined cases will not be like examined
cases. Thus, the PUN has to be justified using experience. It follows that the PUN can only be
justified with RI. The justification is therefore circular and empty.5
The consequence of Hume’s argument is that no rational support can be given in favor of inductive
inferences. One can safely conclude that induction is not a rational inference. Hume provides a
psychological theory of induction, according to which induction is based on certain associations of ideas
carried out by the mind. Once we experience a correlation several times, a mental habit forms, and
we expect the effect to be present every time the cause is experienced. The association between cause
and effect is then explained by psychological processes and principles attributed to human nature.
However, this sort of account is not a justification of the inductive inference, but an explanation of
the natural conditions that give rise to it.
Hume seems to accept what De Pierris (2015, 5) calls a presentational-phenomenological model
of logical demonstration. The idea is that there are relations between ideas that can be grasped
intuitively. If a pair of ideas is inseparable, or it is not possible to conceive of the presence of one
idea without the presence of the other, then the proposition describing the relation is a relation of
ideas. Its truth is recognized a priori and it is not possible for it to be false. Furthermore, if a relation
between two ideas is not grasped intuitively, it is still possible that one would be able to construct a
demonstration – that is, a linked chain of pairs of ideas – in which the relation between each pair is
grasped intuitively as inseparable. The various steps within a geometric proof might not be grasped
intuitively together, but it may be broken down into distinct steps, each of which is intuitively grasped
and leads from one idea to the next. In principle, one should be able to distinguish between knowledge,
5Commentators sometimes object to Hume’s argument by claiming that turning to the PUN to support the RI amounts
to the demand that the RI be turned into a deductive argument. That is, they claim that Hume commits himself to a
deductivist conception of justification. However, it seems to me that this charge is misguided. One might say that introducing
the PUN merely amounts to claiming that inductive inferences are reliable–that is, that they are likely to produce true
results. See Millican (1995, 108) for a similar rebuttal.
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which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain, and probable claims, which lack the certainty
of knowledge-claims.
In the Treatise, Hume suggests that, while one should in principle be able to distinguish between
demonstrative and probable inferences (T1.4.1.1, SBN 180), there are doubts as to whether demon-
strative reasoning actually achieves the certainty one normally attributes to it. If one were to actually
construct a chain of reasoning, one would need to rely on human cognitive faculties to be able to link
the chain of intuitive steps correctly. But there are reasons to doubt that humans have an infallible
cognitive faculty. First, we need to rely on memory, and the assuredness that a pair of ideas that was
perceived in the past as inseparable is in fact correctly remembered as inseparable. And the transition
of awareness from one step of a demonstrative proof to another also requires never transitioning to
ideas that were not linked by inseparable ideas. Because human cognitive faculties rely on some causal
mechanism, the ability to proceed correctly with demonstrative reasoning can legitimately be seen as
potentially unreliable (T 1.4.1.2, SBN 183). Thus Hume thinks that demonstrative reasoning should
be understood as dissolving into probable reasoning, since it can never achieve as a matter of fact the
certainty that mathematicians or logicians normally attribute to it.6
Nevertheless, despite the skepticism Hume expresses about demonstrative reasoning, it is a skep-
ticism that assumes a certain standard of demonstrative validity. Namely, Hume does accept that
awareness of inseparable ideas guarantees the truth of a proposition expressing the relation. It is just
that the human mind is limited, and can have in its direct awareness only a single pair of ideas at a
time. Hume accepts a certain conceivability criterion: If it is possible to conceive of a pair of ideas
as separable, the ideas are, in fact, separable. And if it is not possible to conceive of a pair of ideas
as separable, they are, in fact, inseparable. Thus, the conceivability criterion suggests that for Hume,
there is a standard for demonstrative reasoning, not achievable as a matter of fact, but one that takes
the notion of demonstrative reasoning as a regulative idea.
While Hume is skeptical of demonstrative reasoning, this is a rather benign skepticism in compar-
ison with his skepticism regarding the RI. Hume seems to accept the regulative ideal of demonstra-
tive reasoning without attempting to provide further, second-order justification for it. He makes no
attempt to justify the conceivability criterion or the notion that awareness of separability or insepa-
rability guarantees that the ideas are, in fact, separable or inseparable. However, he does attempt to
show that there is no such thing as a rational, inductive inference, even as a regulative notion. We
6See also De Pierris (2015, 2.4).
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seem to come up empty whenever we try to imagine how the RI might be taken to be rational; that is,
we are not capable of reconstructing how the inference is informed by human reason, assuming there
is a cognitive faculty that guides such inferences. The best we can do is uncover the psychological
mechanisms that establish, by custom and habit, the associations between cause and effect. Yet what
is unclear is why we should accept demonstrative forms of reasoning without second-order justification
while requiring such justification of inductive forms of reasoning.
Ancient forms of skepticism argue that epistemic justification comes in three forms. In one possi-
bility, justification leads to an infinite chain of reasons; if we take q to justify p, it may be that this
would only be possible if q is justified by another proposition r, and so forth ad infinitum. Another
possibility is that the chain of justification runs in a circle. The third possibility is that the chain
of justification ends at a proposition that is not further justified. Either we accept this proposition
dogmatically–that is, claim that some propositions are accepted without justification at all–or we take
these propositions to be self-justified–that is, they are propositions that somehow are able to provide
their own justification. This latter possibility is epistemic foundationalism. Clearly, in the case of rules
of inference (or intuitive awareness of inseparability), neither infinite regress nor circular justification
will do.
Since inductive inferences cannot be reduced to demonstrative reasoning, should we take them
to require some additional justification? A comparison between probable and demonstrative types
of reasoning ought to provide a proper context for evaluating the demand for justification. In the
context of modern theories of logic, deductive reasoning is based on formal rules, which one can use to
establish the validity of arguments. Consider, for example, modus ponens (MP), a rule of deductive
inference. Consideration of MP immediately shows its validity. We normally do not require any
further justification in considering the validity of this rule. In fact, we recognize that the rule supplies
justification for deductive transitions, though we are not usually asked to supply arguments to justify
the rule.
Carroll (1895) famously argued that the attempt to justify MP leads to an infinite regress of higher
levels of MP rules, each intended to justify the MP rule of the lower level. If one were to demand
additional justification for MP, such a demand would lead to infinite regress and no justification at
all. But perhaps rules of inference like MP are rules that cannot be justified, or they are self-justified,
or there is some entitlement one can be given in using them without providing additional justification.
If one of these possibilities is the case, it follows that perhaps Hume should be skeptical of both RI
9
and MP or of neither. But the preference for demonstrative reasoning should at least be explained.7
Hanna (2006, Ch. 3) argues that philosophical attempts to justify logical inferences (whether
inductive or deductive) suffer from what he calls the “logocentric predicament.”8 This predicament
arises from having to rely on the canons of logical inference in any attempt to justify the validity of log-
ical inferences. The predicament seems to crop up in various philosophical accounts that justify logical
inferences. For example, Quine famously objects to Carnap’s conventionalist account of logical truths.
The gist of Quine’s critique is that in trying to apply a logical convention to particular instantiations of
the convention, one needs to already take for granted the validity of the logical inference (Hanna, 2006,
Sec 3.2). Hannah reviews various strategies for dealing with the logocentric predicament, that is, var-
ious accounts of how one can be entitled to use logical inferences without providing them second-order
justification. These strategies normally dissolve the supposed difference Hume points out between
inductive and deductive inferences, because if one is entitled to use deductive inferences without
second-order justification, there is little reason not to grant such entitlement to inductive inferences.
Hanna identifies six strategies for dealing with the predicament: logical prudentialism, logical com-
munitarianism, semantic and epistemic holism, logical nonfactualism, logical instrumentalism, and
logical cognitivism. In general, these strategies dissolve the difference between deductive and induc-
tive inference because they appeal to non-logical facts in their explanation of the entitlement speakers
have in using certain inferential tickets. For example, according to logical communitarianism, logical
rules are the result of communities implicitly adopting certain forms of communication. But this
implies that we can appeal to the norms of argumentation adopted by the community as the ultimate
grounds for utilizing logical rules, opening the door to accepting both deductive and inductive rules
on similar grounds (see for example Strawson (1952, 256-257) and Wittgenstein (1958, 134-136)). Or,
in the case of semantic and epistemic holism, the validity of logical inferences is accepted as part of a
web of beliefs, and its justification results from the coherence it forms in a whole range of propositions
accepted by the community of inquirers, some logical and some factual. Such holistic accounts have
provided a context where the difference between inductive and deductive reasoning seems to dissolve,
because the inductive scheme of reasoning can be viewed as part of a coherent set of beliefs (this is
explicitly argued for by Goodman (1983, 62-66)). According to the non-factualist approach, we can
assume we are entitled to certain inferential schemes without being able to justify these schemes using
7See Perez Otero (2008) for a similar use of Carroll’s paradox as an analogy for inductive justification.
8I thank one of the reviewers for referring me to Hanna’s succinct treatment of the logocentric predicament.
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empirical or a priori evidence. As long as we carefully extend those entitlements so as not to justify
our prejudices, when no evidence exists to the contrary, and if the proposition has a cornerstone role in
enabling a certain practice of inquiry, our acceptance of such propositions can be considered legitimate
(see, e.g., Wright and Davies (2004)). We could then explain our entitlement to such propositions as
expressing our trust in them. This provides opportunity to accept inductive rules of inference based
on such attitudes of trust. The strategies of logical instrumentalism and logical cognitivism have also
been used to dissolve the difference between inductive and deductive forms of reasoning.9
These attempts to take the RI as not requiring second-order justification ignore Hume’s SPA,
or the Secret Powers Argument. The reason the SPA is easy to ignore is that it is not a formal
argument regarding the structure of RI, but an argument relying on the notion of power and the
process by which sensible qualities come into existence. I claim in the following section that the
argument is intended to provide a reason for thinking that RI is not reliable. Thus, evidence against
the reliability of induction produces more skepticism than the claim that any justification of induction
is circular.
3 The Secret Powers Argument
There is widespread agreement that Hume has shown that inductive inferences do not have rational jus-
tification. But a concern lingers over Hume’s argument, which is: Why is justification required? Hume
did not seek second-order justification for demonstrative reasoning. He took propositions expressing
the relation between inseparable ideas to be intuitively or demonstratively certain. He explicated this
with the help of the separability principle, but he did not attempt to justify the principle; and yet he
did require second-order justification for inductive arguments. Probable arguments require a distinct
notion of strength, of a weaker form than deductive validity, because the true premises in an inductive
argument do not guarantee the truth of the conclusion; they merely make it probable or likely to be
true. Yet, perhaps it is still possible to think of RI as a rule of reasoning accepted without justification
in parallel with deductive rules of inference, which are accepted without second-order justification.
I take it that the disparity between inductive and deductive reasoning is bolstered by another
argument, which I shall refer to as the Secret Powers Argument (SPA). Assume we have two proposi-
9Lange (2008, Section 5) also mentions externalist means or taking a naturalist approach towards epistemology to justify
inductive schemes of inference (e.g., Van Cleve (1984) and Perez Otero (2008)). If we presume that there are external reasons
or causes that show that RI is reliable, the rule circularity involved in the justification of induction is not a vicious epistemic
circularity.
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tions, p and q, and both are candidates for propositions we would like to accept without justification.
Any attempt to justify the two propositions leads to self-defeating forms of justification. It seems as
if we are faced with the choice of accepting both propositions or neither, depending on our epistemic
attitude. The situation will cease being the same with regards to both propositions if we have reasons
for thinking that one of the propositions might be false. If, for example, we find evidence that there
are circumstances in which p is likely to be false, but we cannot conceive of analogous circumstances
where q is false, then the self-defeating justification would be telling against p while it would not be
telling against q.
In the Treatise, Hume introduces a further argument against the PUN, or the claim that unex-
amined cases must resemble examined cases.
It may, perhaps, be said, that after experience of the constant conjunction of certain objects,
we reason in the following manner. Such an object is always found to produce another. ’Tis
impossible it cou’d have this effect, if it was not endow’d with a power of production. The
power necessarily implies the effect; and therefore there is a just foundation for drawing
a conclusion from the existence of one object to that of its usual attendent. This past
production implies a power: The power implies a new production: And the new production
is what we infer from the power and the past production. (T 1.3.6.8, SBN 90)
Hume holds that the correlation between two sensible qualities A and B is unexplained, or a mysterious
coincidence, unless we could attribute the body in which A inheres a power to produce quality B. The
power attributed to a body is a certain capacity to produce effects. The attribution of a power to the
body can be considered the metaphysical equivalent of taking the PUN to be valid. If the examined
case in which A was present produced B, then we may conclude that bodies with sensible qualities A
have the power to produce B. Then, the next time we observe a body with A, from the fact that we
can attribute to it the power to produce B, we can predict that B will be present as well. However,
Hume points out that the power itself is unobservable – what is present to the mind is the impression
associated with A, and the impression does not reveal the power that generated the impression; it is
merely the effect of that power.
Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case and at the utmost
can only prove, that that very object, which produc’d any other, was at that very instant
endow’d with such a power; it can never prove, that the same power must continue in
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the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always
conjoin’d with like sensible qualities. Shou’d it be said, that we have experience, that the
same power continues united with the same object, and that like objects are endow’d with
like powers, I wou’d renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion
beyond those past instances of which we have had experience. (T 1.3.6.10, SBN 91)
Hume’s claim is that there is no reason to suppose that the same powers that correlate with observable
quality A would continue to be present in other bodies of the same quality A. This supposition
amounts to the expectation that like sensible bodies are always conjoined with like powers. But
nothing prevents us from thinking that like sensible qualities are conjoined with distinct powers, and
so, nothing underwrites our expectation that future objects with sensible quality A will carry the
same power that produced sensible quality B. It should be clear that the power Hume is considering
is not the causal power of quality A to produce quality B. We may distinguish between the power
to produce B and the sensible quality A because we do not know the internal constitution of bodies
within which A was observed nor do we know what exactly it is that produced B. The notion of
power is the idea that something is present in a body that can produce sensible quality B.
In the Enquiry, Hume articulates a similar argument, which thinks of powers as involving the
‘secrets’ of nature. Thus, in the Enquiry, Hume stresses the difference between qualities “on the
surface,” that is, qualities belonging to macroscopic bodies that are observable to the senses, and the
structure of those bodies and powers that exist in the hidden parts:
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets,
and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she
conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely
depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistency of bread; but neither
sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment
and support of human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of
bodies; but as to the wonderful force or power which would carry on a moving body for
ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating
it to others of this cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this
ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible
qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which
we have experienced, will follow from them. . . It is allowed on all hands that there is no
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known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently,
that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular
conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. (E 4.16, SBN 32-4)
The argument seems to be that the simplest sensible quality is produced by unknown powers. This is
a principled form of ignorance – we know the effects of powers in bodies because we can perceive the
impressions that are produced by them, but we do not know the powers that produced the impressions.
We know the colour, the weight, and consistency of bread, but the power to nourish us remains hidden
from the senses. We know the effects of the force of inertia, but we do not know the force of inertia
itself because we cannot penetrate into the nature of the body beyond the effects that were produced
and observed.
The secret nature of powers opens the door to conceiving of failures of the principle “like sensible
qualities have like secret powers”. That is, we may conceive of ways in which this connection between
effects and the powers that produce them is false. We can conceive of two distinct secret powers
producing similar sensible qualities, a possibility we cannot rule out. It may be that two distinct
powers present in two loaves of bread produced all the same sensible qualities – the same colour, the
same weight, and the same consistency of bread. Yet, it may be that in one loaf of bread those secret
powers would produce nourishment and in another loaf of bread some other secret powers would not
produce nourishment. In that case, it is always possible that the same impressions (or the effects of
certain powers) were produced by distinct powers.
Given the possibility of divergent secret powers that produce the same sensible quality, we can
distinctly and clearly conceive of those cases where induction is likely to fail. These possibilities of
failure do not merely suggest that we can conceive of A as being present without B. The possibility of
A being present without B is merely a conceptual possibility; all it tells us is that the causal relation
between A and B cannot be derived using intuitive or demonstrative reasoning. Nevertheless, the
possibility of distinct powers producing similar sensible effects provides an account of how inductive
reasoning could lead to a false conclusion. Some secret power may have A appear and then also
generate B, while another may have A appear without B. That is, it is possible to conceive of a definite
failure of the inductive procedure despite nature being entirely uniform and consistent because there
is always an unbridgeable distance between observable impressions and the secret powers in bodies
that produced them.10
10Schliesser (2017) in a blog post discusses the role of the SPA in Hume’s argument against induction. Schliesser places
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The SPA provides Hume with independent reasons for thinking that inductive inferences are not
reliable:
As to past experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those
precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but
why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for
aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which
I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such
sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow,
that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities
must always be attended with like secret powers? (E 4.16, SBN 32-4)
The SPA provides us with distinct reasons for thinking that inductive generalizations could lead to
false conclusions, even if we hold nature to be uniform – or, in other words, even if we imagine the
same powers always yield the same effects. But if the SPA provides reasons for thinking that the RI
is unreliable, it goes further than the NRSA, which merely indicates to us that there are no means
of justifying the RI since justification will end up being circular. The SPA therefore separates the
RI from any deductive reasoning, in that it describes the exact circumstances in which the argument
fails.
In this sense, we see that the SPA works in tandem with the NRSA, and that neither argument
is sufficient by itself for securing Hume’s conclusion. The SPA merely shows when inductive gener-
alizations could fail, but it would not provide ultimate grounds for taking the RI to be unjustified if
other justification might be given in its support. On the other hand, the NRSA, while valid, cannot
ground the non-rational nature of the RI, given that it is possible to treat basic rules of inference as
the bedrock of rational justification, so they themselves do not require independent justification. It is
both the SPA and the NRSA that lead to Hume’s skeptical conclusion, but neither is sufficient.
The problem with the SPA is that, to make it plausible, one has to entertain some potential theories
of matter and the metaphysical notion of power or action so as to conceive of various possibilities of
secret powers. The argument lacks the clean non-specific structure possessed by formal analyses of
rules. Thus, the articulation of a potential failure of the RI cannot completely abstract from the
metaphysical or scientific context within which the argument is made. It is therefore tempting to
Hume’s argument in relation to the explanatory models of Early Modern philosophy, where essences, inherent natures, or
active principles are taken to be the origin of the effects of natural bodies on other bodies. Thus we may think of Hume’s
argument as undermining the explanatory ideals of 17th- and 18th-century science.
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lay the SPA aside, given that it is not an argument concerning the formal structure of RI. In the
vast majority of reconstructions of Hume’s argument, the SPA is not mentioned as an independent
component in Hume’s reasoning, and it is ordinarily taken to give further support for undermining
the PUN, even though the NRSA by itself is not sufficient to drive Hume’s conclusion.
4 Newtonian Induction
We have seen that Hume’s argument is directed at Newtonian science, and his claims purport to
show the non-rational nature of inductive inferences. It is likely that Hume speaks to the newly
established image of science. The view, promoted by the Royal Society, was that a true science is
based on the Baconian method. Science must begin with a direct examination of the phenomena, and
use a methodical and slow process of deducing scientific propositions from the phenomena. Newton
articulates his commitment to induction in Newton’s Rule IV for the Study of Natural Philosophy:
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should
be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses,
until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exception.
(Newton, 1999, 796)
Hume does not think that there is any alternative to the inductive method. He himself can be taken
to articulate a Newtonian-like project for the moral sciences, where rules of association for ideas are
naturalized and taken to be analogous to the gravitational force that generates attraction between
bodies.
What does Newton mean by induction, and can we take Hume to be attacking the same method
utilized by Newton? By undermining the causal relations that underwrite matters of fact, Hume is
introducing a skeptical argument that supposedly undermines all ampliative reasoning that might be
used by scientific theories. The target is any necessary connection that scientific propositions might
form between sensible qualities, ones that are not derived from intuitive or demonstrative reasoning.
Hume’s argument models such ampliative reasoning as follows: First we observe a regularity in nature;
namely, we observe two sensible qualities conjoined together in repeated observations and experiments.
Then we conclude that the two sensible qualities are linked by a necessary connection, and that it is
not possible for any future occurence of the first sensible quality to be present without the second.
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For Hume, it is this simple template for inductive reasoning that underwrites all scientific reasoning.11
However, Newton’s various arguments in his published work are quite complex. He often presents
his arguments in deductive, mathematical style, constructing proofs and relying on axioms and derived
propositions to articulate his theories. Newton’s reasoning often seems more abstract than the simple
enumerative induction depicted by Hume. His work in the Opticks most closely resembles Hume’s
account of the scientific inference. Newton describes various experiments he performed, wherein he
finds a necessary connection between a ray of light’s angle of refraction in moving from one medium
to another and the ray’s color. While the angle of refraction is not a sensible quality, it is not
difficult to deduce this angle from observations and from basic knowledge of the motion of rays of
light. Once the basic connection between the angle of refraction and color is articulated, Newton
deduces many other propositions from this basic proposition. Newton thinks that his conclusions are
more certain than mere Baconian generalizations because the reasoning from experiments is mediated
via geometric theorems and propositions and is based only on observations and not hypotheses or
conjectures. Thus, given that the angle of refraction is defined exactly by Euclidean geometry and
given that no hypotheses regarding the nature of light are employed, one can draw more precisely
and more exactly various conclusions from the basic axiom of the Opticks. This does not imply that
Newton believes his conclusions carry the same certainty as mathematical certainty since physical
principles are being relied upon in the derivations. He does think that the connection between the
angle of refrangibility and color is demonstrated with certainty, that is, without relying on conjecture
or hypothesis (see Walsh (2017, 873-876)). Nevertheless, there is no conflation between the certainty
Newton attributes to experimental demonstrations and mathematical certainty.12
11Although Hume’s account of the inductive method appears to align with Francis Bacon’s account of induction, it seems
as if Bacon’s thinking about induction is much more embedded in matter theory than most commentators realize. Bacon
argues that observations and experiments are designed to find the connection between forms and natures. Bacon’s notion of
nature mostly correlates with a simple sensible quality. However, the notion of form seems to relate to those active principles
in corpuscles that give rise to changes in corpuscular forms. Thus, forms are not necessarily sensible qualities; they may
exist below the realm of observable qualities. Moreover, while Bacon argues that observations and experiments ought to
reveal that certain forms are necessary and sufficient for certain natures, he does not imagine this connection to be that of
a cause-effect relation, but rather thinks of it as an identity relation between an unobservable corpuscular arrangement and
observable qualities. An example would be the correlation between corpuscular motions and heat. Thus it is not clear that
Hume’s argument undermines even Baconian induction. I elaborate on this reading of Bacon in Belkind (Belkind).
12Based on their interpretation of Rule IV for the Study of Natural Philosophy, Ducheyne (2012, 82 n. 151, n. 152) and
Walsh (2017) think that Newton takes his conclusions in the Principia to carry certainty, undermining those commentators
who take Newton as thinking of his scientific theories as probable at best. According to Ducheyne and Walsh, perhaps
Newton takes mathematics to be so central to his analysis of phenomena as to render his arguments non-ampliative or
purely demonstrative. This claim takes its cue from the proper translation of the Latin text of Rule IV. The text is usually
translated as saying that the results of inductive inferences should be taken as “either exactly or very nearly true”. But the
proper translation, according to Ducheyne, should be “either exactly or as most closely as possible true”. This opens the
possibility that Newton takes his theory to be certain and, if any corrections are required because of future observations,
that the theory be made to cover a smaller scope or made less general rather than be corrected. Contrary to Ducheyne and
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Newton’s inferences in the Principia are more complex, as he does not explain in much detail how
one might derive his laws of motion from experiments and observations. Moreover, it is clear that
some extrapolation and idealization takes place in articulating the laws. Moreover, in the Principia,
Newton deduces from the Phenomena the centripetal nature of the force of gravity and the fact
that it is inversely proportional to the distance squared. But the inference seems to be a deductive,
mathematical inference, rather than a generalization from particular experiences.
Indeed we might describe the main inferences in Book III of the Principia as following a Demon-
strative Inductive form of reasoning.13 According to this reasoning, one may use a phenomenal law
and some background causal law or law of nature to deduce, using valid deductive arguments, other
scientific propositions. From Kepler’s Area Law14 and the laws of motion and with the help of Eu-
clidean theorems, Newton deduces the centripetal nature of the force of gravity. Furthermore, from
Kepler’s Harmonic Rule15, the centripetal nature of the force, and from the laws of motion, Newton
derives the inverse-square nature of the force. These arguments are deductive arguments that rely on
phenomenal laws and laws of nature as their premises. Despite their deductive nature one may think
of these arguments as inductive since they enable Newton to derive the nature of the gravitational
force from the observed motions of the planets and moons in the solar system. Moreover, it seems as
if Newton’s argument follows a certain Baconian ascent: the initial step to the centripetal nature of
the force is a low-level generalization from the phenomena. The next inference to the inverse-square
nature of the force is a further ascent and an introduction of a higher level generalization, or “axiom”.
Thus it may be that Newton is following a Baconian project whereby induction is the gradual process
by which higher and higher levels of generalizations are introduced step-wise.16 It may be that by
induction Newton is referring to non-ampliative arguments that rely on mathematical reasoning that
use phenomenal laws and laws of nature as their premises to introduce higher level generalizations.
Even though Hume’s skeptical argument does not directly undermine arguments in the form of
Demonstrative Induction, it does undermine them in indirect ways. First, in order to utilize phenom-
enal laws as premises in Demonstrative Inductive arguments, one may question the whether those
laws can project into the future. If, for example, we consider Kepler’s Area Law, we see that the law
Walsh, I think that, even with the translation corrected, the correct interpretation is that his results can be approximations
to the true descriptions or are only probably true.
13For an explanation of this form of reasoning see Dorling (1973), Harper (2012), Norton (2003), and Belkind (2012).
14The Area Law states that the radius to the satellite from a central body covers equal areas in equal periods of time.
15According to Kepler’s Harmonic Rule the period of completing satellite’s orbit is proportional to the mean radius to the
power of 3/2, or t2 ∝ R3.
16See Ducheyne (2005) for this reading of Newton’s method.
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articulates a correlation between two distinct aspects of a satellite’s motion – the area traversed by the
radius to the satellite and the time that passes. The phenomenal law projects into the future the claim
that the satellites will continue to behave in the same manner, and so one could raise Humean doubts
about the justification of this claim. Second, the argument in the form of Demonstrative Induction
relies on causal laws or laws of nature to derive the conclusion. And, once again, one can raise Humean
doubts about whether it is legitimate to extrapolate those laws from observations. The situation is
exacerbated with regards to laws of nature because Newton uses the counterfactual validity of these
laws in the derivation. Such validity is directly related to the type of necessity associated with the
law. Since arguments in the form of Demonstrative Induction are only as good as the premises of the
argument, it is legitimate to think at first glance that Hume’s skeptical argument undermines New-
ton’s reasoning, both in the Opticks and in the Principia. Nevertheless, there is a certain inductive
strategy Newton uses in establishing the validity of laws of nature. It is this Newtonian inductive
scheme that seems to evade Humean skepticism. In a nutshell, while Hume conceives of induction
as substantiating causal claims between two sensible qualities, Newton’s use of of induction is very
much embedded in a corpuscular framework. Newton intends to use induction to reveal the primary
qualities of corpuscles. The laws of nature are then taken to describe the types of actions that can be
attributed to the most basic material corpuscles.
When Newton turns to his investigation of gravity, he expects gravity to be a sensible quality
reducible to the mechanical qualities of the ether. However, in the years before writing the Principia,
Newton arrives at the conclusion that gravitational effects cannot be reduced to the action of a
mechanical ether.17 As he says in the General Scholium in the third book of the Principia:
Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of
gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity. Indeed, this force arises from some
cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without any diminution
of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the quantity of the surfaces of the
particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the
quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances,
always decreasing as the squares of the distances. (Newton, 1999, 943)
17For an account of Newton’s argument for the Universal Law of Gravity, see Harper (1990, 2002, 2012), Smith (2002),
Janiak (2008, 2015), and Belkind (2012).
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Were gravity to be reducible to the mechanical actions of an ether or a mechanical medium, we would
expect the gravitational effect to depend on the area and the shape of the surfaces of bodies. But
gravity does not behave in this way. The force of gravity penetrates the most inner recesses of bodies
without weakening its power. Moreover, the law describing gravity is a universal law of nature, given
that “gravity exists in all bodies universally and is proportional to the quantity of matter in each”
(Newton, 1999, Proposition 7, 810). But how does Newton arrive at the conclusion that gravity exists
in all bodies universally?
Rule IV and the explicit insistance on induction was only added in the third edition in 1726, while
in the second edition (1713), induction is only mentioned in the General Scholium (Newton, 1999,
943). I will not go into differences between the various editions of the Principia, but will examine the
relevant methodological rule, Rule III:
The qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted [i.e., qualities that cannot
be increased and diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be
made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. (Newton, 1999, 795)
Rule III articulates Newton’s methodological rule, with the help of which one may uncover the uni-
versal qualities of matter. The rule is a summation of two criteria. A quality Q is deemed universal
if and only if
1. Q is observed in all bodies on which experiments can be made.
2. Q is invariant, i.e., it cannot be intended or remitted.
Rule III is appealed to in Book 3, Proposition 6, Corollary 2, where Newton says that all weights
that were measured (that is, the weights of bodies on the surface of Earth, the weights of the planets
relative to the sun, the weights of the moons of Jupiter relative to Jupiter, etc) are proportional to the
quantity of matter (i.e., to mass). He claims that “This is a quality of all bodies on which experiments
can be performed and therefore by rule 3 is to be affirmed of all bodies universally” (Newton, 1999,
809).
On its initial reading, Rule III reads like an inductive generalization.18 The gravitational quality
was measured in all bodies on which experiments and observations were performed. Then, Newton
concludes that the quality is affirmed of all bodies universally. The inference seems like an inductive
18The inductive reading of Rule III can be found in Achinstein (2010), Biener and Smeenk (2012), De Pierris (2012), and
Ducheyne (2012, 117).
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argument, although one performed on a massive scale. We are looking at all bodies that were observed,
and concluding regarding all bodies whatsover that they have the quality. So the inference is something
like the following: “All observed bodies have quality Q”, therefore, “All bodies have quality Q”.
Now it might be that we have some pause regarding the notion of “body” since Newton did
not provide an a priori definition of this notion. He did say at the beginning of the Principia that
he associates the concept of Quantity of Matter or Mass with the notion of body.19 However, the
explication of Rule III argues that impenetrability is shown to be a universal quality given that it
obeys Rule III. Thus, even the universality of impenetrability and its connection with “being a body”
is supposedly derived from Rule III. Furthermore, it is by virtue of impenetrability that a body has
mass or Quantity of Matter. The upshot is that a body is not defined a priori as that which has mass;
rather, Newton argues that empirical evidence suggests that the two are associated. We can think
of Rule III as providing the criteria for determining which qualities are primary, which is indirectly
the criteria for discovering the necessary qualities for being a material body. The novelty in Newton’s
procedure is that the more qualities that can be universalized are discovered, the more determinate
we can make the notion of body.20
The reading suggested here of the notion of body does not conflict with the reading articulated by
Brading (2012), according to which Newton takes the notion of body to be completed by articulating
the laws of nature that apply to bodies. As we shall see shortly, the function of Rule III is to
provide criteria for identifying the primary qualities of bodies. But at the same time that a quality is
universalized, the law that governs a quality’s action is recognized as a universal law of nature. Thus,
we may see Rule III as doing two things at the same time: universalizing qualities to all bodies and
19In the explication of the definition of Quantity of Matter, Newton says, “For the present, I am not taking into account
any medium, if there should be any, freely pervading the interstices between the parts of bodies. Furthermore, I mean this
quantity whenever I use the term “body” or “mass” in the following pages. It can always be known from a body’s weight,
for – by making very accurate experiments with pendulums - I have found it to be proportioned to the weight, as will be
shown below” (Newton, 1999, 404).
20It is plausible to assume that, initially, by “body” Newton means whatever it is that can generate sensory impressions
on the human mind. The notion of body is that which can be manipulated in experiments or influenced so as to generate
sense-impressions on the human mind, whether by direct or indirect means. This notion is confirmed by a little creation story
that Newton articulates in the De Grav. In this story, Newton imagines God creates bodies by rendering certain regions of
space impenetrable. He also imagines that God allows those impenetrable regions to move about, colliding and interacting
according to the laws of motion dictated by God. Newton argues in the De Grav that we can take these impenetrable regions
to be bodies, as long as they meet certain conditions: “(1) that they be mobile. . . (2) that two of this kind cannot coincide
anywhere, that is, that they may be impenetrable. . . and (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses and the
imagination in created minds, and conversely be moved by them” (Newton, 2004, 28-29). Given that Newton takes both
mobility and impenetrability to be shown as universal by Rule III, the only a priori notion of body that is left takes a body
to be that which can generate perceptions in created minds.
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determining which regularities can be treated as laws of nature.21
Many commentators have interpreted Rule III as an inductive inference performed on a grand
scale, generalizing to all bodies. Such qualities are difficult to find, and perhaps the main difference
between the type of induction that Newton considers in Rule III and the inductive arguments that
Hume discusses is that Newton is concerned with a very short list of qualities, ones that 17th-century
philosophers like Boyle and Locke referred to as the primary qualities of bodies. Newton lists extension,
impenetrability, hardness, force of inertia, and mobility as the universal qualities. This list is more or
less accepted by Newton’s contemporaries as primary qualities.
However, if one reduces Rule III to universal induction, then it is not clear what role one might
attribute to the invariance criterion. Thus, the argument that universalizes the quality looks as follows:
All observed bodies have quality Q.
Q is invariant.
Therefore, all bodies have quality Q.
In a recent paper (Belkind, 2017) I have traced the textual origins of the invariance criterion and
demonstrated the relation between this criterion and Newton’s corpuscularianism. The type of invari-
ance that Newton insists on is invariance under changes of “texture”– that is, it is invariance under
changes of the configuration of the body’s parts. To understand this idea, we need to understand why
Newton thinks that proportionality to mass has important methodological implications.
The most important evidence suggesting that gravity cannot be reduced to the mechanical prop-
erties of the ether is the fact that gravity is proportional to the mass of the gravitating body. This
property of gravity is deduced from the fact that gravitational acceleration is the same for all bodies.
For example, if we take several pendulums, each with a made a different material, the pendulum’s
period will always be the same for a particular pendulum length, no matter what the weight of the
pendulum is or what it is made of. One can infer from this that gravitational acceleration on the
surface of Earth is the same for all bodies. Moreover, it follows that the gravitational force is always
proportional to the body’s mass.
21A discussion of criteria and principles of individuation is beyond the scope the paper, which Brading takes to be relevant
to the problem that is solved by taking laws to be constitutive of the notion of body. I may add that in Newton’s thinking,
laws of nature are constitutive of the notion of action. The individuation of action requires both laws of nature and the
notions of absolute space and time. He then takes bodies to be defined by the types of actions that they generate. So
laws of nature are constitutive of bodies, but only indirectly, via their constitution of actions. Moreover, the notions of
impenetrability and mobility, and centripetal forces, are epistemically crucial in individuating bodies and the qualities that
can be attributed to them. But we should also recognize that, while all laws of nature are constitutive of the notion of
bodies, not all laws are essential in articulating criteria or principles of individuation.
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But if gravity is proportional to the body’s mass, we can imagine that it arises from forces operating
on the body’s ultimate parts, and not from any particular configuration of the parts. If a property is
proportional to mass and to no other bodily property, it always divides exactly as the body divides.
So, for example, if the force of gravity operating on a body weighing 1 kg is of a certain magnitude,
dividing the body into two parts, each weighing 1
2
kg, the force of gravity will be divided in half
as well. And if the parts are divided further, the force of gravity will be divided accordingly in
proportion to the masses of the parts. If we continue and divide the body further, until we reach
the smallest particles from which the body is made, the force of gravity will be divided further and
further, exactly as matter is divided. All of this indicates that proportionality to mass implies for
Newton the invariance of the quality under variations of configuration or texture. Because the quality
arises from the qualities of the ultimate parts, the contingent configuration of the parts makes no
difference to the quality in the composite body.
The purpose of the invariance criterion is therefore to show the reducible nature of the gravita-
tional force. According to Newton, we may conclude from the premises of the argument the following
conclusion:
All observed bodies have quality Q.
Q is invariant under changes of configuration.
Therefore, all ultimate parts of observed bodies have quality Q.
We may call this sort of inference transductive, following McGuire (1967, 1968, 1970). The transductive
inference sanctions the inference from qualities of composite bodies to qualities of their ultimate parts.
McGuire argues that transduction is even riskier than inductive inferences because it is an inference
from observable qualities to qualities of bodies that are unobservable in principle. Newton presupposes
that certain physical magnitudes behave like extensive magnitudes. Namely, these are magnitudes
where the quantity correlates with the “number” of parts in a body. For example, length and volume
are extensive magnitudes because the size of a body indicates the magnitude of the body. If we divide
the body of a certain volume into n parts, the size of the composite body would be the sum of the
sizes of each of the parts. Finally, Quantity of Matter behaves like an extensive magnitude because
the Quantity of Matter of a composite body is the sum of the Quantities of Matter of each of the
parts.
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We see that Newton’s inference is composed of two distinct inferences.22 The first inference is
a transductive inference, while the second is that of a universal induction. So we may think of the
combined inference as follows:
Transduction
All observed bodies have quality Q.
Q is invariant under changes of configuration.
Therefore, all ultimate parts of observed bodies have quality Q.
The second inference is the following:
Universal Induction
All ultimate parts of observed bodies have quality Q.
Therefore, all ultimate parts of bodies have quality Q.
The last inference can be considered universal induction. It underwrites the notion of a primary
or a universal quality. Because we have evidence that a certain quality is present in all the corpuscles
from which observed matter is comprised, Newton concludes that the quality can be deemed universal.
Furthermore, it is in virtue of the universality of the quality that the laws describing the action of
this quality are deemed laws of nature. The purpose of Rule III is not to reveal the ultimate causes of
these primary qualities, nor can it argue that all these qualities are inherent in or essential to bodies.
What can be deduced from Rule III is the quality’s universal nature.23
22Achinstein (2010) argues, for example, that there are non-formal aspects of Newton’s induction that must be taken into
account to understand the nature of Newtonian induction. But he does not explain the relation between the non-formal
aspects and the transductive inference.
23In a recent paper, Biener and Schliesser (2017) argue that there is a tension between the universality claimed by Rule
III for laws of nature and a certain passage in Query 31 of the English edition of the Opticks. In the passage, Newton claims
that God could have varied the sizes, shapes, densities, and forces of particles, which would as a result vary the laws of
nature, and created different kinds of worlds governed by distinct laws. Biener and Schliesser claim that this suggests that
laws of nature are contingent for Newton and dependent solely on God’s will. It seems as if this suggestion undermines
the universality insisted on in Rule III. Biener and Schliesser resolve the tension by differentiating between the context of
constructing a natural philosophy versus a metaphysical context. For the purpose of grounding a science of our world, Rule
III implies that certain qualities and laws are universal. The metaphysical context is one where the modality of laws of
nature is explored and their contingent nature articulated. This reading seems plausible, except that it is not clear what
Newton means by different worlds that exist in different regions of space – what then are the criteria by which a world
is isolated or insulated from other worlds? Is there a principled way in which a particle of one world is screened off from
entering another world? The law of inertia implies, at least, that particles in our world, if they are able to get detached
from the attractive forces in our world, will eventually be able to penetrate any world in any direction in space. It seems to
me that the suggestion in Query 31 is simply incoherent. There is no way to correlate between “worlds” and laws of nature
that inhabit these worlds, unless these worlds are somehow metaphysically isolated. However, Newton does not provide any
criteria for isolating or individuating worlds. It is odd that Newton would genuinely think that the universality of laws of
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5 Newtonian Induction and Hume’s Problem of Induc-
tion
We shall now consider how Newtonian induction fairs under Hume’s argument against the rationality of
induction. An initial examination should provide a negative judgement: Hume has shown conclusively
that induction is not a rational inference, and so it more forcefully applies in the case of universal
induction. The scope of universal induction is wider than any inductive inference considered by Hume.
The more risk the inductive argument takes, the more skeptical we should be of the conclusion.
Newton’s inductive inference is of a staggering scope: He claims that every single particle of matter
in the universe, including particles of galaxies that exist millions of lightyears away, will have the
gravitational quality. Moreover, while writing the Principia, Newton had knowledge of but a minuscule
portion of the universe. He had observations of a few planets rotating around a very remote and
insignificant sun, some measurements of moons rotating around Jupiter, Saturn, and Earth, and of
bodies accelerating on the surface of Earth. Yet his conclusion supposedly embraces the vast expanses
of the universe, to which Newton never had any access.
The immense inductive risk in Newton’s argument is further exacerbated by the NRSA. Hume has
shown that the inductive inference cannot be justified. If one pursues the inductive generalization,
then one cannot appeal to any further arguments to show that the inductive risk is justified. So
Newton’s argument seems both risky and lacking any further justification.
However, the SPA seems undermined by Newton’s argument. If Newton uncovered evidence that
certain powers reside in the ultimate parts of matter, one cannot appeal to the SPA to demonstrate
the potential failures of the inductive inference. The powers attached to the ultimate parts of matter
are the secret powers that one can associate with particles. If a body can be divided, the quality
is expected to divide along the resultant bodies exactly as the extensive measures of the quality are
divided. Thus, it is not possible to separate the quality from the body or from its parts. Furthermore,
it is not possible to diminish the quality by reconfiguring its parts. Thus, the SPA is made irrelevant
by Newton’s transductive argument. In virtue of the inseparability of the power from bodies (given
its divisible nature), we expect the same powers to be present “all the way down”, to the least bit
of matter. The worry that there might be different powers that produce the same sensible qualities
becomes obviated. The power in the composite body is merely the aggregate of powers present in the
nature could somehow be limited to particular regions of the universe.
25
ultimate parts.
The second inference Newton applies is the universal inference from ultimate parts of examined
bodies to unexamined ultimate parts. When considering the inference to the unexamined ultimate
parts, one expects the power to be either present or not present in the unexamined particle. If the
power is not present, there is no alternative secret power to appeal to that would explain why it is
not present (it being an ultimate part). If it is indeed not present, then it is merely the capriciousness
of nature that would allow for the quality to present in some ultimate parts of observable matter,
but not in others. We can take the universal induction to be based on the notion that nature is not
entirely capricious. In other words, the correlation that is supported by universal induction is not
between a cause and its effect or between two sensible qualities. Rather, the correlation is between
“being a body” and “having quality Q”.
One might think that perhaps in the SPA Hume is targeting some Principle of Uniformity of
Nature implicit in Newton’s reasoning.24 Newton’s Rule I for the Study of Natural Philosophy asserts
that “we are to admit no more causes of natural things than such that are both true and sufficient to
explain their appearances.” It seems as if Newton is committing himself to the view that Hume targets
since Hume’s claim in the SPA is that we cannot take bodies to have the same powers whenever we
see the same sensible qualities produced by these bodies. However, Newton’s application of Rule I is
not the same as the principle being attacked by Hume, according to which like causes are assumed
for like effects. The way Newton uses Rule I suggests that he is not linking unknown causes with
known effects. Newton uses Rule I to argue that different systems governed by the same force-laws
are generated by the same forces. The forces in four distinct systems (the sun and its planets, Jupiter
and its moons, Saturn and its moons, and the Earth and its moon) are governed by a centripetal,
inverse square law. The effects we see are all explained by the same law governing the action of central
bodies. Rule I allows Newton to conclude they are different manifestations of the same force. We
might think of this as taking the law that governs the action of the force to define the nature of the
force (so like effects (laws) are produced by like causes (forces)). The idea of cause-effect that Hume
has in mind is entirely different. For Hume, causes are distinct from effects, and the effect is not a
law but a sensible quality. In any case, the process of the universalization of qualities in itself does
not rely on the principle that like effects presuppose like causes. Rather, it relies on criteria for the
universalization of qualities.
24I thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this possibility.
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Since the SPA is made redundant by Newton’s transductive argument, it follows that there is an
opening for Newton to accept the inductive inference without second-order justification. According to
this option, one does not seek rational justification for the inductive inference, given that universal
induction is the grounds for inferring the nature of material bodies from the empirical evidence. The
justification for adopting universal induction would be the same as the justification for deductive
rules of inference: Namely, they are accepted in virtue of their basic status as ultimate grounds
for probable inferences. Moreover, given that we have no positive reason to doubt the validity of
Newtonian induction provided by the SPA, it seems rational to adopt the inductive inference.
Hume’s reconstruction of the inductive inference seems ignorant of the nature of Newtonian induc-
tion.25 This is not merely due to the lack of mathematical training or understanding of Newtonian
science on Hume’s part, although this might contribute to Hume’s misunderstanding. Rather, the
problem also has to do with Newton’s cagey explications of Rule III. The revisions in the Principia
suggest that Newton initially presupposed a corpuscular framework as a hypothetical background to
the Principia. In the first edition of the Principia Newton takes for granted that matter consists of
indivisible atoms, all possessing the same kinds of power. Although he attempts to show that, in
contradistinction to the mechanistic paradigm of Descartes and his followers, particles also possessed
gravity, a non-mechanical quality. But the revisions Newton includes in the second edition of the
Principia demonstrate that he had to reconcile his corpuscularianism with his inductivist methodol-
ogy. He avoided the conflict by backing away from an explicit commitment to atomism and replacing
it with a methodological rule with the help of which one can uncover the primary qualities of mate-
rial corpuscles. Thus in the second edition replaces hypothesis 3, which appears in the first edition,
with Rule III. The purpose of Rule III is to show that instead of making an explicit commitment
to corpuscularianism, one can appeal to the extensive nature of qualities to differentiate them from
secondary qualities, or qualities that are not universal in all bodies. Newton’s cagey methodological
remarks and his transductive inferences were understood by very few individuals.
Hazony and Schliesser (2016) argue that one way in which Hume criticizes Newton’s reasoning is
by replacing Newton’s Rule III with a rule describing the proportionality between causes and effects,
which is Rule VII in Hume’s Treatise (T I.III.15.9). Hazony and Schliesser take this rule to be the one
25The relationship between Hume and Newton is complex. On the one hand, Hume describes himself in the Treatise as
someone who is carrying out a Newtonian style investigation of the human mind. On the other hand, he is critical of core
aspects of the Newtonian project, including the nature of absolute space and time, the reality of forces, and the universality
of laws. See Schliesser (2007), De Pierris (2012), Hazony and Schliesser (2016), and Slavov (2016) for an assessment of the
relation between Newton and Hume.
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intended to replace Rule III, because it seems to employ mathematical proportions between causes and
effects, and Hume refers to the gravitational force as a compositional force, suggesting that gravity
is proportional to the causes that are present in the parts of bodies (Hazony and Schliesser, 2016,
690). With the same rule, Hume seems to show that one cannot universalize gravity beyond the
realm of our experience. But it is clear that Newton’s invariance criterion does not describe the
proportionality between causes and effects; rather, it describes the proportionality that arises from
the extensive nature of qualities. This proportionality does not show us that, say, the intensity of heat
is proportional to the intensity of warmth that we feel: rather, the quantity of gravity is proportional
to the “number of parts” in a body or to the body’s mass.
While Newton’s universal induction seems to escape Hume’s skeptical conclusions, there is still a
worry concerning the quality of extension. Newton lists Rule III as an empirical methodological rule
by which extension can be shown to be a universal quality. However, the problem is that he conceived
of the invariance criterion as invariance under changes of form or, in other words, invariance under
changes of the corpuscular configuration of the parts. The spatial configuration of the parts is described
with Euclidean laws, that is, with the laws that are justified by the universality of extension. So, one
can see that the invariance criterion presupposes the universality of extension and the necessary status
of laws of geometry, while Rule III supposedly uses the invariance criterion to universalize extension.
This perhaps is not a problem in Hume’s account since he deems that geometry a science that belongs
to relations of ideas and does not depend on any empirical considerations. However, Newton does
seem to hold a dual epistemic approach toward spatial properties. First, it is an a priori science
used to describe potential geometric figures to be found in absolute space. Second, the extension of
bodies is taken to be universalized via Rule III, that is, via an empirical rule for revealing the primary
qualities of bodies.
Once we accept that extension is a universal quality, we can think of Newton’s Rule III as providing
an empirical criterion for extending our knowledge of primary qualities. First, by showing that impen-
etrability and hardness behave like an extensive quality, Rule III demonstrates these to be universal,
primary qualities. Given that Quantity of Motion is proportional to mass, or to an extensive quantity,
Rule III can then demonstrate the force of inertia and mobility to be universal. Finally, relying on
the nature of mass and on the counterfactual validity of laws of motion, the inferences of Book III of
the Principia and Rule III demonstrate the universal nature of gravity. Thus, at each step, Rule III




In my reading of Hume’s argument against induction, the skeptical conclusion only follows if one
combines the NRSA with the SPA. Without the SPA, the NRSA opens the door for accepting the rule
of induction as a fundamental rule of inference, one that grounds probable inferences without requiring
second-order justification. But with the SPA, there is enough suspicion regarding the reliability of
induction to reach the skeptical conclusion.
Newton’s Rule III combines two criteria for the universalization of qualities. The first criterion
describes the empirical basis of the inference. Only qualities that are observed in all bodies can
potentially be universalized. Second, the invariance criterion requires that a quality be invariant under
changes of configuration. The two criteria lead to two inferences. First, a transductive inference: if
a quality is invariant under changes of the configuration of the parts, then its quantity is divisible
and it is possible to conclude that the quality is present in the ultimate parts of observable matter.
The next inference is a universal inductive step – from the ultimate parts of observable matter, to
all atomic parts of matter. The correlation is not between a cause and an effect, but the universal
relation between “being a body” and having a certain quality. Thus, the unexamined particles of
matter cannot be conceived as carrying some secret powers responsible for the same quality, given
that an ultimate part of matter does not have any secret powers since the powers are directly attached
to it. Thus, Newtonian induction is open to the possibility of accepting the rule of induction as a
fundamental rule whose validity is accepted without further grounds. Newtonian induction, unlike
most forms of induction, does not lead to the same skeptical conclusion. This is in spite of the fact
that Newtonian induction is more risky than most inductive inferences because it applies to all parts
of material bodies.
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